ABSTRACT: A relation is obtained between weak values of quantum observables and the consistency criterion for histories of quantum events. It is shown that "strange" weak values (such as values less than zero for projection operators) always correspond to inconsistent families of histories. It is argued that using the ABL rule to obtain probabilities for counterfactual measurements corresponding to those strange weak values gives conceptually inconsistent results. This problem is shown to be remedied by using the standard quantum conditional probability for weak values involving inconsistent histories. It is argued that an assumption of reverse causality (a form of time symmetry) implies that weak values obtain, in a restricted sense, at the time of the weak measurement as well as at the time of post-selection. Finally, the problem of how to interpret strange weak values and their associated strange probabilities is discussed. It is concluded that these values cannot generally be interpreted as the answers to a set of counterfactual questions for the same individual particle, but instead describe properties of an ensemble.
Introduction
Weak values of quantum mechanical observables are generalized expectation values for the case of pre-and post-selection. They can be thought of as expressing an "average" value of an observable with respect to two different states rather than with respect to a single state (as in the usual expectation value). Weak values get their name from the fact that they can generally only be measured through a "weakened" measurement procedure in which the interaction Hamiltonian provides only a slight coupling between apparatus and system. This results in a significant imprecision which requires the measurement of a large number of individual systems -i.e., an ensemble-in order to measure a single weak value.
In contrast to weak values, counterfactual statements strictly apply to a single individual system. However, in view of the difficulties in making counterfactual statements about individual quantum systems, a number of authors (cf. Y. Aharonov, A. Botero, S. Popescu, B. Reznik, J. Tollaksen (2001) , L. Vaidman (1990, 1991) , L. Vaidman (1996) ) have proposed weak values as an alternative way of demonstrating some of the strange properties that such counterfactual statements would have, if they were in fact valid. In the following I consider to what extent weak values can be taken as a legitimate, experimentally verifiable "substitute" for the counterfactual statements to which they seem to correspond.
Weak Values and the Consistency Criterion for Event Histories
A weak value for an observable effectively defines a history, i.e., a sequence of events. Therefore one way to learn more about weak values is to study them in terms of Griffiths' formulation of consistent histories (cf. Griffiths 1996) .
Consider a family of histories comprised of two possible sequences of events Y and Y ′ , where the events occur at times t 0 , t 1 and t 2 consecutively:
where D is the projection operator corresponding to the preselection state |D , F is the projection operator corresponding to the post-selection state |F , and E and E' are complementary, exhaustive projections of a complete observable possibly measured between events D and F. In other words, E ′ = (1 − E).
If the family is consistent, that means that the probabilities of the two histories are additive, i.e.:
(where (Y ∨ Y ′ ) denotes the disjunction of the two histories).
Loosely speaking, (*) requires that the two histories do not "interfere" with each other. The two-slit experiment famously violates the condition (*), if we think of Y and Y' as representing the particle leaving the source, going through one slit or the other, respectively, and landing on the screen.
The consistency condition as given by Griffiths (1996) is concisely written as:
The definition of weak value of an observable E in the context of such a history is 1 Using the Schrodinger operator representation and zero Hamiltonian between the events.
The consistency condition (1) can be written in terms of weak values (2) as follows:
Equation ( Recall first that F |D is always nonzero, otherwise the weak value is undefined.
If E w = 1, then E ′ w = 1 − E w = 0, by the additivity of weak values; so (3) is satisfied. On the other hand, if E w = 0, then (3) is also satisfied.
If, however, the weak value of E is neither zero nor 1, clearly expression (3) will not vanish and the consistency condition will not be satisfied. This shows that "strange" weak values always correspond to an inconsistent family of histories.
Example: The Three-Box Experiment
The famous 3-Box example yields interesting weak values: an ensemble pre-and post-selected in a certain generalized state φ||ψ yields a weak value of being in Box A with certainty if that one is opened, and in a different box B with certainty, if that one is opened. The relevance of these results is strictly to the ensemble, not each individual system: what they tell us is that particles successfully selected when box A was actually opened had to have been in that box, and that particles successfully selected when box B was actually opened had to have been in that box. What the weak values do not apply to is what "might have been" if a counterfactual box was opened in the case of a single, particular particle which was pre-and post-selected when a different box was actually opened. To make the latter inference, one needs a consistent set of histories whose members include a history in which box A is opened as well as a history in which box B is opened-but that set of histories is inconsistent, as shown in Cohen (1995) . The requirement for a consistent set of histories corresponds to the requirement that there be a determinate value (even if unobserved) for the counterfactual measurement. Such determinacy requires that the event structure corresponding to the family of histories form a Boolean algebra, which can support a classical truthvalue assignment (cf. Bub 1997, pp. 13-22) . This requirement will be further clarified following a discussion of other "strange" weak values.
Among the most interesting kinds of weak values are those which are negative:
i.e., the weak value of certain observables, despite the fact that they are essentially just projection operators, can be less than zero. Such values appear in the 3-Box example (cf. Vaidman 1996 , Griffiths 1996 as well as the Hardy (1992) example as analyzed by Aharonov et al (2001) . For instance, in the 3-Box experiment discussed by Vaidman (1996) , the weak value of the observable corresponding to whether a particle is in the third box, for the given pre-and post-selected states, is −1. Similarly, in the Hardy example, the weak value of the observable corresponding to having an electron-positron pair in the non-overlapping arms for the given pre-and post-selection is −1. In what follows we analyze each of these examples by considering an explicit post-selection observable basis to see more clearly how the weak value manifests itself as an apparatus state, and how a time symmetry postulate affects the interpretation of that state.
First, consider the three-box experiment for the case in which the observable corresponding to opening box C is weakly measured at time t 1 (with an associated weak value of −1).
Particles are pre-selected in state
and post-selected in the state
where |a , |b , and |c correspond to each of the three boxes and form an orthonormal basis for the system's Hilbert space.
We also define an orthonormal "post-selection" basis containing the postselected state |φ : this will be the set
The apparatus is in the initial unsharp ready state (as projected onto the pointer variable x basis):
where the uncertainty ∆ in pointer position is much larger than the difference between pointer positions corresponding to measurement results, and x 0 is the ready position.
The apparatus pointer states for measurement results (in this case for projection operators) are
corresponding to 1 or "yes," and
corresponding to 0 or "no."
The sequence of events is described as follows:
At t 0 the combined state for system + apparatus is:
At the intermediate time t 1 the interaction Hamiltonian establishes a correlation yielding the entangled state:
Rewriting this in the post-selection basis, we find:
If we now collect terms in the system post-selection basis, an apparatus superpositon becomes apparent:
All of the above, (9) through (11), apply to the same intervening time t 1 . At time t 2 , postselection of the state |φ occurs and only the first term remains; thus we obtain finally
Before going further, it should be noted that the term "measurement" as applied to the process at t 1 is somewhat inaccurate for the following reason. At time t 1 , all that has happened is that a correlation has been established between the apparatus states and eigenstates of C; no single term of the resulting superposition has yet been "projected out" in the sense of a state vector collapse or von Neumann projection postulate.
2 Therefore, to avoid confusion, in what follows I will refer to the process at t 1 as a "partial measurement." However, it should be noted that one can complete the measurement on the apparatus only (i.e., record a definite pointer result) without disturbing the system, since the collapse will only occur in the apparatus Hilbert space-i.e., the collapse will be with respect to the sharp pointer operator X on the apparatus Hilbert space only. Discussions of weak values usually assume only a partial measurement at t 1 because it is simpler to analyze.
The above steps can be considered as equally applying to the case of a sharp partial measurement of C at time t 1 (in which case the apparatus states, corresponding to the "which box" operator (in this case C), are orthogonal, or have zero spread). We see that partially measuring C, either sharply or weakly, creates a superposition of apparatus states corresponding to the "normal" values of "yes"
or "no" for the presence of the particle in whichever box is being opened. This indeterminacy of the apparatus state with respect to the post-selection state is characteristic of "strange" weak values. Normal weak values correspond to determinate apparatus states relative to the post-selection state.
For the unsharp observable states |χ i , the mean value of the pointer location
x turns out to be −1, which can be measured through a statistical analysis of a large number of identically pre-and post-selected systems. So in this sense, one can truly "measure" a strange weak value, but only on an ensemble, not on an individual system. Claims that the weak value can be measured on a single system (cf. Aharonov and Vaidman [1990] ) always involve "mega-systems" (my term)
which consist of a large number N of identical systems. Such systems themselves are simply ensembles, and the measured observable is always essentially a singlesystem observable being measured N times. Consider equation (11) which expresses the state of the combined system at the intervening time t 1 . If we adopt the idea that the backward-propagating postselection state φ| has the same status as the forward propagating state |ψ , we have to consider that the system somehow "knows" about its future post-selection, or bears that imprint, just as much as it bears the imprint of its preselection.
(For arguments in favor of this approach, cf. Aharonov and Vaidman (1990) or Price (1996) .) So let us consider a given particle as "fated" to be post-selected in state |φ . We might therefore conclude that the second term in (11) is not applicable (notice that this departs from standard quantum mechanics) and that therefore one can consider the combined system to be ontologically describable by (12) rather than (11) at t 1 . In that case the apparatus is describable by the superposition in (12) which reflects the weak value. This conclusion differs from that of Busch (1988) , who assumes time asymmetry, with causality moving only from the past to the future.
However, even if we consider the total system as described by (12) at t 1 , rather than by (11), what this tells us is that the particle is described by its pre-and be obtained on a single pre-and post-selected high spin particle. 4 There are, of course, certain phenomena such as the decay of the neutral K meson which suggest some empirical deviation from strict time-reversal invariance. The time symmetry considerations in this paper are restricted to the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum theory, in which all laws are time-symmetric. post-selection states and that the apparatus is in a superposition of pointer states, i.e., it has an indeterminate pointer value. The weak value of −1, which arises from an averaging procedure over many runs, cannot be considered as applicable to either the particle or the apparatus in any particular run of the experiment.
"Strange" weak values and the ABL rule
Before considering the meaning of the strange weak value of −1, first let us compute what might seem to be the corresponding probability of finding the particle in box C: the value given by the much-discussed ABL rule (Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [1964] ). The ABL rule gives the probability of an outcome of an observable actually (sharply) measured at time t 1 given known pre-and post-selected states at t 0 and t 2 respectively.
In this case we need to use the form of the ABL rule appropriate for degenerate operators, first presented in Aharonov and Vaidman (1991) . First some notation: let the projection operator on the space of eigenstates corresponding to the value x be denoted by P x . In this case, the two possible eigenvalues are c or c ′ where the latter indicates "not in box C." So the two projection operators will be P c = |c c| and P c ′ = 1−P c = |a a|+|b b|. Then the ABL probability for outcome "particle in box C," given the above pre-and post-selected states, and provided C was actually opened, is:
Therefore, it is uncontroversially correct to say of any given particle in such an ensemble that if box C was in fact opened, that particle had a probability of
of being in the box. Note that this value corresponds to a non-counterfactual situation since the measurement has occurred; i.e, the particle has been disturbed, and is described at t 1 by an ignorance-type mixed state in the eigenspace of the C observable. In contrast, the weak measurement is supposed to leave the particle undisturbed, so it is still in a pure state.
The ABL rule can also be expressed in terms of the relevant weak values, P c w = φ|Pc|ψ φ|ψ
Now, Using the fact that P c ′ = 1 − P c and the additivity of weak values, we find
Obviously, if we substitute the value −1 for P c w , (16) still gives 1 5
for the probability of finding the particle in box C. This result presents a problem for claims that the ABL rule always gives valid results for counterfactual (or weak) measurements on pre-and post-selected systems regardless of whether the history in question belongs to a consistent family. For (16), which gives the ABL probability associated with the relevant weak value, tells us that the particle is in box C 20% of the time, a perfectly "normal" figure. So there seems to be an inconsistency arising between the weak value itself and the counterfactual ABL probability associated with that weak value. (This is not a problem for the case of an actual C measurement at t 1 since the particle has been disturbed and its state projected into a classical probability space.) This inconsistency can be avoided by not using the ABL rule in cases where no actual measurement has occurred at t 1 and instead using the standard quantum mechanical conditional probability for this case, which would be
But note that (17) is just equal to the weak value itself, since
So the quantum conditional probability associated with the weak value of a projection operator is just that weak value. (This should, of course, come as no surprise since the ordinary expectation value for a projection operator is just the Born probability for finding the system in the state corresponding to that projection operator.) In general, however, the physical concept of an average value of an operator is different from that of the probability of a given measurement outcome; they appear to be the same in the case of projection operators simply because the eigenvalue corresponding to the projection operator is 1. However, note that the units are different: the weak value of P c considered as a number or "occupation" operator has an answer in units of number of particles, in contrast to the probability of finding a particle in a given location. In this case, the weak value of −1 means that we should expect to find −1 particles in box C; in contrast the conditional probability (17) gives the probability of finding a particle in box C. Thus, using (17) instead of the ABL rule, we have the result −1 for the conditional probability of the particle's being in box C given that it has been pre-and post-selected with no (or only a weak) measurement at time t 1 . This result, as bizarre as it is, is consistent with the strange weak value of −1 for the number of particles in box C at time t 1 .
Again, notice that this inconsistency between the probability given by the ABL rule and the weak value itself only arises for "strange" weak values. A normal weak value for a projection operator is 0 or 1, and substituting either of these into (16) gives 0 or 1 respectively (since the right hand side is equal to P c w if and only if | P c w | 2 = P c w .) This is because the ABL rule (16) and the quantum mechanical conditional probability (17) are equivalent for histories belonging to consistent families, as shown in Kastner (1999) .
What should we make of the negative weak value, as well as the negative corresponding probability, of a particle being in Box C when it has not been looked for (or measured only weakly)? In particular, is it the answer to a counterfactual question about that particular particle? I would answer in the negative, for the following reasons.
It is well known that negative probabilities often arise in the study of quantum systems; 5 this is one of the striking differences between classical and quantum theory. For example, the negative probabilities associated with the Klein-Gorden equation have been understood as reflecting that equation's inapplicability to individual particles. Feynman discusses the puzzle of negative probabilities in his (1987), concluding that negative probabilies make formal sense but correspond to situations that can never be directly observed. 6 Weak measurements seem to provide a way to observe them (via weak values), but only through statistical analysis of an ensemble. So apparently the best one can do in the way of empirically detecting "strange" weak values and their associated negative probabilities is to deduce them from the measurement statistics of ensembles.
Returning to the discussion at the beginning of Section 3 concerning the ThreeBox example, if we use (17) to obtain the conditional probability of finding a particle in either box A or box B, we get the value 2. Since a single particle's probability of being in either of two boxes must be nonnegative and cannot exceed unity, 7 a reasonable conclusion is that this value does not describe a single individual particle. On the other hand, the result makes sense if it is considered as describing a property of an ensemble of identically prepared (pre-and postselected) particles: it can be understood as describing the fact that any given member of the ensemble can be located with certainty in either box A or box B.
That is, if the probability that particle ω 1 is in box A is 1 and the probability that particle ω 2 is in box B is 1, adding the probabilities of unity associated with those events gives the value 2. But the combined event involves two distinct systems.
The ensemble understanding of the −1 value would be: Particle ω 3 has a probability 1 of being in any one of the three boxes; subtracting probability 2 of particles ω 1 and ω 2 being in box A and box B respectively (as described above)
gives a net probability of −1 for occupation of box C. But of course, this event describes three different particles. Thus the resulting value −1 does not correctly describe any given individual particle.
Another way to look at this proscription against attributing the results of certainty for box A and box B to the same individual is in terms of what Vaidman calls the "And Rule" for elements of reality (i.e., outcomes whose predicted/inferred probability is unity), which does not hold for pre-and postselected systems [Vaidman (1993 [Vaidman ( ), (1996 ]:
7 It will not do to add the value −1 for the probability of the particle's being in box C in order to obtain a "normal" probability value, because the question "what is the probability of the particle's being in either box A or box B" is a perfectly well-defined question that "stands alone" and should be answerable on its own terms.
And Rule: If A = a is an element of reality and B = b is an element of reality then A = a and B = b is also an element of reality.
Vaidman interprets the antecedent of this statement as applicable to a single given pre-and post-selected system (not an ensemble), and states that the consequent does not hold for the same individual system. However, another (and I would claim, better) way of understanding the "And Rule" is to say that what it really prohibits is attributing two or more results receiving a probability of unity ("elements of reality") to the same particle; for to do so is de facto to combine them. That is, it can be argued that asserting that "particle ω 1 has element of reality A = a and element of reality and B = b" (the antecedent in the definition above) is in itself already a violation of the And Rule, for it attributes both elements of reality to the same individual particle, constituting a physical instance of the And operation.
The above interpretation, that "strange" probabilities-those arising from inconsistent familites of histories-never apply to a single individual particle, is consistent with Feynman's view that situations characterized by negative probabities are "unattainable" or "unverifiable" (Feynman 1987, p.244 ) (where here the term "verifiable" corresponds to detecting properties of a single individual particle), as well as with the standard understanding of the negative probabilities arising from the Klein-Gorden equation.
A note is in order about what is meant by probabilities applying to a single particle, as opposed to an ensemble. The question of exactly what is meant by quantum mechanical probability remains an intriguing open question and is beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes, the relevant point is that a probability of unity would normally imply that a given individual system possesses the associated property with certainty. The problem addressed here is the case in which theoretically deduced probabilities exceed one or are less than zero.
The proposed solution is that in fact those probabilities do not really apply to a single particle.
The Hardy Experiment
As observed by Aharonov et al (2001) , the Hardy experiment constitutes another example of a "strange" weak value. (Due to space considerations, I will merely sketch the experimental setup and quantum states in the Hardy example; for detailed information, the reader is invited to consult the original reference Hardy (1992) and the above paper by Aharonov et al.) The Hardy experiment consists of two overlapping interferometers, one containing an electron, e-, and the other a positron, e+. The interferometers are precisely tuned in such a way that if both e-and e+ are in the overlapping arms, they will meet and annihilate one another. There are two detectors C and D in each interferometer, one of which (D) can only be activated if there is an object in the overlapping arm. The curious feature is that it is possible for both D's (i.e., D-for the electron and D+ for the positron) to click and yet for the e-, e+ pair not to annihilate one another (i.e., not to both be in the overlapping arms). Note that this corresponds exactly to a failure of the consistency condition (*), for it contradicts the classically necessary idea that either the electron (positron) is in the overlapping arm and the detector D-(D+) can click or the electron (positron) is not in the overlapping arm and the detector D-(D+) cannot click. That is, these two histories should be mutually exclusive, but quantum mechanically they seem not to be. Aharonov et al. show that the Hardy setup gives rise to a "strange" weak value of −1 for the observable corresponding to e+ and e-both being in the non-overlapping arms.
Let us first confirm that this weak value indicates an inconsistent family of events corresponding to both particles being (or not being) in the non-overlapping arms at time t 1 .
First some terminology:
The states are |O and |NO for a particle in the overlapping or non-overlapping arm, respectively; a subscript of p or e denotes the positron or the electron. The two-particle states are constructed as direct products of the single-particle states.
The initial or preselection state |ψ and the final or post-selection state |φ considered by Aharonov et al are: The pre-and post-selection states respectively are:
Now, the "strange" weak value of −1 arises for the pair in the non-overlapping arms, state |1 in this notation. It is easily verified that the consistency condition fails (where E = |1 1| and E ′ = |2 2| + |3 3| + |4 4|):
As in the Three-Box example, let us calculate the combined state vector at time t 1 in the post-selection observable basis. Such a basis for the Hardy experiment is given by the following set of vectors, where we rename |φ with a subscript (1) and the rest of the basis vectors consecutively:
If the apparatus states for "yes" and "no" are as in the Three-Box example, the total system's state at t 1 is given by:
Once again, we have a superposition of apparatus states with respect to the postselection state (see the first term in (25)). As in the Three-Box case, the strange weak value of −1 should not be interpreted as saying that there is "−1 electronpositron pair" in the nonoverlapping arms in any given run of the experiment.
Instead, the −1 figure reflects a property of the ensemble associated with the given pre-and post-selected states.
In contrast, the normal weak values, corresponding to consistent histories, correspond to a determinacy of the apparatus with respect to the post-selection state.. Consider, for example, the 3-Box example when Box A is opened at time t 1 . The combined state at t 1 in terms of the post-selection observable basis is 
We see that there is a "mixing" or superposition of apparatus states only for those values of the post-selection observable that are not selected (i.e., |φ′ and |φ′′ ). The resulting "normal" weak value of 1 allows us to infer that the particle was located in Box A with certainty. However, we can't combine that inference with the weak value of 1 associated with opening Box B and apply those to the same individual particle; to do so would be equivalent to measuring the C observable, because the outcome of "the particle is in Box A or Box B" is precisely the complement of "the particle is in Box C."
Conclusion
The consistency criterion of Griffiths (cf. 1996) is expressed in terms of weak values and it is shown that "strange" weak values always correspond to inconsistent histories. It is also shown that using the ABL rule to obtain probabilities corresponding to strange weak values, such as −1, gives conceptually inconsistent results for the case of weak or counterfactual measurements, and that using instead the standard quantum mechanical conditional probability, which is just equal to the weak value, gives conceptually consistent results for such measurements. In addition it is argued that assuming a complete lack of disturbance of systems during weak measurement together with a reverse causality postulate results in the conclusion that the apparatus superposition reflecting the weak value can be considered applicable at the time t 1 of the measurement.
Since "strange" weak values and their associated probabilities violate the probability constraints for individual systems, and since such values can never be empirically detected in individual systems, it is concluded that such values cannot be properly interpreted as answers to counterfactual questions about individual systems but instead describe properties of an ensemble. This is consistent with
Feynman's argument that negative probabilities (which correspond to negative "strange" weak values) only apply to situations that can never be directly observed, and also with the standard conclusion that the Klein-Gordon equation, which gives rise to negative probabilities, cannot be considered a single-particle equation.
Nevertheless, it is certainly true that weak values yield puzzling results, and that post-selection brings with it some surprising and useful features (cf. Mermin (1997), Bub (2001) ). It is my hope to have suggested a possible avenue to solving the puzzle posed by "strange" weak values.
